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The paper primarily investigates the interrelationship between financial sector 
development and poverty reduction in Ghana. This is done using time-series data from 
the World Development Indicators from 1970-2001. The main findings are, first, that 
even though financial sector development does not Granger-cause savings mobilization 
in Ghana, it induces poverty reduction; and second, that savings do Granger-cause 
poverty reduction in Ghana. Also, the effect of financial sector development on poverty 
reduction is positive but insignificant. This is due to the fact that financial 
intermediaries in Ghana have not adequately channelled savings to the pro-poor sectors 
of the economy because of government deficit financing, high default rate, lack of 
collateral and lack of proper business proposals. Another interesting finding is that there 
is a long-run cointegration relationship between financial sector development and 
poverty reduction. 
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Domestic resources serve as a vital engine of growth and poverty reduction. However, 
the effective mobilization of domestic resources depends on an efficient and well 
developed financial market. The financial sector in Ghana has undergone change in 
terms of the number of institutions and services rendered, as a result of the financial 
sector liberalization programme pursued in the late 1980s that led to interest rate 
liberalization and the entrant of new players. The outcome of this liberalization policy is 
reflected in Ghana’s financial development indicators: the M2/GDP ratio increased from 
0.195 in 1996 to 0.32 in 2003. Similarly, over the same period the currency/M2 ratio 
declined from 0.41 to 0.29. 
Despite these developments, the level of mobilized domestic resources, savings 
included, has not been enough to stimulate private investment to propel the economy 
towards the desired level of growth. Savings as a percentage of GDP were 5.5 per cent 
in 1990, declined to 1.3 per cent in 1992 and continued to exhibit oscillatory trends until 
the year 2000 when a savings-to-GDP ratio of 3.5 per cent was recorded. On a positive 
note, the savings ratio has increased consistently thereafter and by 2002 reached 7.4 per 
cent (Figure 1). 
However, private savings in Ghana remain low by African standard. Gross domestic 
savings as a percentage of GDP in Ghana are low compared to many African countries, 
and averaged 6.4 per cent between 1980 and 2001, while the corresponding figures were 
37.4 per cent for Botswana, 21.4 per cent for Cameroon, 21.6 per cent for Nigeria, 13.9 
per cent for Kenya and 7.3 per cent for Malawi (World Bank 2003). Thus, domestic 
resource mobilization has been relatively low, despite the innovations and developments 
within Ghana’s financial sector. 
The development in the financial sector has also occurred during a period when poverty 
declined in Ghana, although the direction of causation has not been established. 
Between 1992 and 1999, the number of people considered to be poor dropped from 51 
per cent to 40 per cent (GLSS 3 and 4). However, not all groups gained from this 
reduction in poverty. There were both winners and losers, the winners being the export 
farmers and the losers the foodcrop farmers, the majority of whom were women. In 
addition, people living in the urban areas of the northern savannah experienced an 
increase in their poverty level. 
Poverty increased during the 1990s in the Upper East, Northern and Central regions, 
while significant reductions in poverty at the national level have been concentrated in 
four regions of Western, Greater Accra, Volta and Brong Ahafo. Other regions (Central, 
Northern, and Upper East) have experienced large increases in poverty between 1991 
and 1999, while the remaining regions show little change. The Ghana Statistical Service 
(2003) results showing the distribution and intensity of poverty across regions are given 
in Figure 2. The proportion of the poor in the three northern regions remains high 
relative to other regions. About 68 per cent to 74 per cent of people in the three northern 
regions are either poor or very poor compared to between 18 per cent and 58 per cent in 
other regions. The level of poverty in Ghana when viewed in terms of occupation 

















































Source:   World Bank (2004). 
 
Figure 2 
Regional distribution of households by poverty status 
 

































































Source:   Ghana Statistical Service (2000). 
Thus far, there appears to be some development in Ghana’s financial sector and 
aggregate poverty has declined, but the issue of whether the financial developments 
induced the poverty decline in Ghana remains a mystery. This problem is the focus of 
this paper. Section 2 traces the development of Ghana’s financial sector from the 1990s. 
Section 3 examines the interrelationship between financial sector development, savings 
mobilization and poverty reduction. Section 4 presents the method of analysis, and 
section 5 analyses the data. The final section provides the concluding remarks. 
2  Developments in Ghana’s financial sector 
As with most developing countries that have pursued economic and structural reforms, 
Ghana has undergone a process of financial sector restructuring and transformation as 
an integral part of a comprehensive financial sector liberalization programme. Ghana’s 
financial sector liberalization programme began in the early 1990s as part of a 
comprehensive macroeconomic adjustment programme with the support of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This involved the restructuring of 
distressed banks and the cleaning up of non-performing bank assets to restore banks to 
profitability and viability. 
The programme set the prices right, and initiated structural reforms to include fiscal and 
monetary operations as well as privatization, banks included. The reforms were a 
throwback to the history of severe distress and dysfunction in the banking system, 
illiquidity and insolvency, interest rate controls, and credit rationing punctuated by an 
event of vetting of accounts and the lingering effects on security deposits and 
confidentiality. In retrospect, the financial sector adjustment programme (FINSAP) was 
a successful reform agenda, though it remains a powerful reminder of the banking 
problems of the 1990s. 4 
The financial system that emerged after the reforms is relatively diversified in the range 
of services and increasingly offers innovative new products. While small- and medium-
sized private enterprises depend extensively on self-financed capital investments, the 
economy is dominated primarily by bank-intermediated debt finance. The next stage 
and the thrust of financial market policy was therefore the development of a vibrant 
capital market as a vehicle for raising funds to support large amounts of equity finance 
and investment. 
The reforms, liberalizing interest rates and bank credit by government, transformed the 
financial sector from a regime characterized by controls to a market-based one. The 
central bank also shifted gradually from a system of direct monetary controls to an 
indirect system that utilized market-based policy instruments. As part of the process, the 
Bank of Ghana rationalized the minimum reserve requirements for banks, introduced 
new financial instruments, and opened market operations for liquidity management. 
These policies were complemented with an improvement in the soundness of the 
banking system through a proper regulatory framework, the strengthening of bank 
supervision, and an upgrade in the efficiency and profitability of banks, including 
replacement of their non-performing assets (Quartey 1997). 
As part of the process of full liberalization, the Bank of Ghana introduced in the first 
quarter of 2003 ‘universal banking’, which allows banks to undertake commercial, 
development, investment or merchant banking without the need for separate licences. 
The practice also enables all banks capable of expanding into, or currently operating in 
banking areas other than those permitted by their licence or regulations, to undertake all 
types of banking business. This development, however, depends on the capital resources 
of the institution as it would, with the expected expansion, assume greater risk and 
therefore would need to be well resourced. There were further developments within 
Ghana’s financial sector in 2003 which included the acquisition of 50+ per cent equity 
stakes in SSB Bank by Société Générale, the establishment of a local branch office by 
Citibank, Union Bank of Nigeria’s acquisition of 20 per cent equity stake in Home 
Finance Company, a local mortgage institution, and the launch of a real time gross 
settlement system for high value transactions. These financial sector reforms have led to 
changes in Ghana’s monetary indicators, which are discussed below. 
2.1  Financial deepening  
The reforms had significantly affected Ghana’s financial development. The level of 
financial deepening as measured by Cu/M2+, M1/GDP, M2/GDP and Cu/GDP 
improved between 1996 and 2003. Table 1 shows that M2+/GDP ratios increased from 
0.195 in 1996 to 0.32 in 2003. Similarly, the currency/GDP ratio improved by 1.4 
percentage points over the same period, while the currency ratio (Currency/M2+) 
improved by 12.0 percentage points for the same period. In Ghana, currency accounts 
for a greater proportion of transactions. Thus, the persistent decline in the currency ratio 
since the year 2000 signals an improvement in the financial depth of the economy. The 
decline in cash holdings in recent times can be attributed to the increase in the use of 
electronic cards within the economy. 5 
Table 1 
Financial deepening, 1996-2003 
 Nominal  Nominal  Currency  Nominal        
  M2+  M1   (Cu)   GDP          
Year-end  Cedis bn  Cedis bn  Cedis bn  Cedis bn  M2+/GDP M1/GDP  Cu/GDP  Cu/M2+ 
1996   1,785.0    1,215.1    724.0    9,167.0    0.195    0.133    0.079    0.41  
1997   2,506.0    1,765.7    981.8    13,863.0    0.181    0.127    0.071    0.39  
1998  3,903.0    2,070.0    1,083.6    17,157.0    0.227    0.121    0.063    0.28  
1999  4,896.5    2,192.5    1,272.4    20,580.0    0.238    0.107    0.062    0.26  
2000  7,248.1    3,516.5    2,635.5    27,153.0    0.267    0.130    0.097    0.36  
2001  10,248.0    5,121.8    3,089.9    38,014.0    0.270    0.135    0.081    0.30  
2002  15,368.1    8,218.0    4,671.6    47,764.0    0.322    0.172   0.098   0.30 
2003  20,875.4    11,074.3    6,039.3    65,262.0    0.320    0.170   0.093   0.29 
Source:   Bank of Ghana Statistical Bulletins (various years). 
2.2  Trends in interest rates 
The prime rate has declined consistently from a high of 37.0 per cent in 1998 to 25.5 per 
cent in 2003 and further to 18.0 per cent in 2004. The Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC) raised the prime rate from 24.5 per cent in December 2002 to 25.5 per cent in 
January 2003 to reflect the generated inflationary pressures following the monetary 
expansion that was undertaken during the last quarter of 2002. The rate was reduced in 
February to its December 2002 level, only to be raised steadily to 27.5 per cent by April 
2003 when petroleum price adjustments caused inflation to reach 30 per cent. The prime 
rate was maintained at this level until July when the inflationary pressures receded. The 
MPC gradually reduced the rate to 21.5 per cent by year-end 2003 and it was 18.8 per 
cent by the end of 2004. 
Table 2 
Interest rates, 1998-2003  
  Averages (% per annum) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Central bank        
Bank rate/prime rate*  37.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 24.50 25.50 
Treasury bill discount rate (91days) 26.75 31.49 38.00 27.65 23.68 26.36 
Interest rate equivalent 28.67  34.18  41.99  29.70 25.16 28.27 
        
Commercial banks        
a.  Deposit  rates        
 Demand  deposits  4.70  8.50 16.75 13.50 8.00 8.50 
   Savings deposits  16.50 10.50 18.00 14.50 11.13 11.09 
  Time deposits (3 months)  29.50 21.75 33.50 23.25 16.22 14.28 
 Certificates  of  deposit 25.25  18.75  33.75  18.00 14.56 15.79 
 Call  money  23.00  na  28.00 17.00 12.17 12.52 
 Others  22.27  17.44  24.80 18.33 12.83 13.42 
b.  Lending rates  38.50 36.50 47.00 43.75 36.36 34.95 
Note:  *  The prime rate was introduced at the end of March 2002. 
Source:   Bank of Ghana Statistical Bulletins (2004). 6 
Meanwhile, the savings rate has increased marginally over the same period: from 16.5 
per cent in 1998 to 18 per cent in 2000 but declining thereafter to 11.09 per cent in 
2003. Similarly, the lending rates of banks have also responded marginally to the 
decline in the bank’s prime rate. The lending rate was 38.5 per cent in 1998, rose to 47 
per cent in 2000 but declined to 34.95 per cent in 2003. Obviously, such a huge margin 
between the lending and savings rate does not augur well for financial intermediation 
and this is reflected in the low savings rate in the economy. 
In contrary, the money market rates were more flexible to interest rate movements 
compared to lending and borrowing rates. Between 2002 and 2004, the rates on money 
market instruments and the inter-bank weighted average rates were the most responsive 
to movements in the prime rate during the period. In response to the downward trend in 
the prime rate during the second half of 2003, the 91-day bill rate and the weighted 
inter-bank average rate declined by the end of 2003 by 16.61 and 9.55 percentage 
points, respectively. 
2.3 Domestic  resource  mobilization 
The level of private savings in Ghana is low by African standard and in recent times 
there appears to be a shift from savings and time deposits towards money market 
instruments (ISSER 2004). The share of money market instruments increased 
consistently from 48.9 per cent in 1995 to 57.7 per cent in 2001 and then to 62.7 per 
cent in 2003, while the share of savings deposits in total private savings declined 
steadily from 27.1 per cent in 2001 to 23.0 per cent in 2003 (Table 3). However, 
although time deposits declined from 15.8 per cent in 2001 to 13.1 per cent in 2002, 
these increased to 14.3 per cent in 2003. Thus, money market instruments remain a 
dominant component of total private savings, accounting for 62.7 per cent of total 
private savings in 2003, while savings deposits and time deposits accounted for 23.0 per 
cent and 14.3 per cent of total private savings, respectively (Table 3). Also, between 
2001 and 2003, preferences shifted from short-term instruments towards long-term 
instruments. 
The year 2003 also recorded an increase from Cedis 3,332.7 billion in 2002 to 
Cedis  4,786.0 billion in the nominal values of private savings and an increase of   
 
Table 3 
Private savings with formal financial institutions, 1995-2003 (%) 
Year  Money market instruments  Savings deposits  Time deposits  Total 
1995 48.9  40.2    10.9  100 
1996 51.0  39.8    9.2  100 
1997 52.0  30.7    17.3  100 
1998 55.6  25.3    19.1  100 
1999 51.5  19.9    28.6  100 
2000 61.2  23.8    15.0  100 
2001 57.7  27.1    15.8  100 
2002 58.1  28.8    13.1  100 
2003 62.7  23.0    14.3  100 
Source:   Calculated from the Bank of Ghana Statistical Bulletin (February 2004). 7 
43.6 per cent for time deposits as compared to the 32.5 per cent growth rate recorded 
between 2001 and 2002. Foreign currency deposits with domestic money banks (DMBs) 
rose from Cedis 3553.3 billion to Cedis 4576 billion, representing a 28.8 per cent 
increase compared to an increase of 49.7 per cent recorded in 2002 (Table 3). This 
partly accounts for the relatively low changes in 2003 in money supply growth, inflation 
and the exchange rate as compared to the preceding year. 
It is worth emphasizing that most savings, especially by the relatively poor, are held in 
the form of real assets. Aryeetey (2005) argues that this equilibrium portfolio allocation 
results from both the poor performance of financial assets and the strong desire for 
owning the real assets used directly in production. These, in turn, are both consequences 
(in large part) of information asymmetries. The poor performance of financial assets is 
not particularly surprising, because financial ‘saving’ is affected by precisely the same 
information and enforcement difficulties as ‘lending’. As a result, much of the financial 
savings that does occur is held within close social groups in order to circumvent the 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems associated with entrusting assets to 
strangers. 
3  Financial sector development and poverty reduction 
3.1  Financial sector development and savings mobilization 
Literature clearly suggests a strong positive relationship between financial sector 
development and savings mobilization. In the early works of McKinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973), they argue that the liberalization of interest rates would end financial 
repression and cause financial deepening due to the resulting increased efficiency of the 
intermediation process, and the effects of higher interest rates on savings. The 
difference between the hypotheses of these two authors is in the transmission 
mechanisms through which they believe this process would occur. Similarly, Mavrotas 
and Santillana (1999) present the theoretical links between financial sector liberalization 
and savings mobilization based on the life-cycle or permanent income theory of 
consumption. They argue that financial liberalization increases competition between 
providers of financial intermediation, thereby eliminating the constraint on borrowing. 
This means that the young can now borrow in order to attain their optimal lifetime 
consumption path.  
Empirical studies on the linkage between financial liberalization and the 
consumption/savings decision of individuals can be classified largely into two groups, 
depending on whether the focus is on consumption or savings. The group of studies that 
focuses on consumption usually extends the Euler equation framework of Hall (1978) 
and Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and examines whether consumption growth responds 
to various measures of financial liberalization. These studies typically find that financial 
liberalization increases current consumption growth by relaxing credit constraints (see, 
for example, Ludvigson 1996; King 1986; de Brouwer 1996; and Bacchetta and Gerlach 
1997). However, the results from these studies are not directly related with the issue of 
financial liberalization and saving.  
According to the standard theory, the interest rate is positively correlated with 
consumption growth (permanent income hypothesis) but has an ambiguous impact on 8 
saving. Similarly, financial liberalization may affect consumption growth but with no 
clear effect on saving. However, the results of some studies suggest that financial 
liberalization actually reduces the quantity of savings (Muellbauer and Murphy 1993; 
de Melo and Tybout 1986; Jappelli and Pagano 1994; Ostry and Levy 1995; Bandiera et 
al. 2000). On the contrary, Bandiera et al. (1998) using a principal components analysis 
find that the effects of financial liberalization on savings differ across countries; there is 
no evidence of significant and sizeable interest rate effects. Overall, there is no firm 
evidence that liberalization increases savings; often it will reduce it. 
Although financial liberalization can enhance the efficiency with which saved resources 
are channelled into productive use, the effect on the quantity of savings is theoretically 
ambiguous (Bandiera et al. 2000). The mechanisms at work here include both long-term 
and short-term effects. Having settled down, a competitive liberalized financial system 
will typically be characterized by improved savings opportunities, including higher 
deposit interest rates, a wider range of savings media with improved risk-return 
characteristics and, in many cases, more banks and bank branches, as well as other 
financial intermediaries. Bank lending rates will typically be higher for those borrowers 
who had privileged access in the restricted regime, but access to borrowing should be 
wider. These long-term effects of liberalization on aggregate private savings will be felt 
through changes in the rates of return and in the degree of credit restrictions. Moreover, 
financial liberalization can have a favourable effect on the allocation of resources which 
will generate increases in income that will, in turn, increase savings. 
The process of financial liberalization also unleashes a series of short-run effects. In 
particular, not only can the process of domestic portfolio adjustment lead to transitory 
changes in the volume of domestic savings, but (especially when combined with 
liberalization of the foreign exchange market) it may also induce large capital inflows 
and such inflows, if not sterilized, can result in a credit boom leading to real income 
surges. These, in turn, have a direct but transitory effect on the volume of savings. 
Therefore, in modelling the effect of financial liberalization on saving, consideration 
would have to be given to these short-run effects, as well as the long-run effects. It is 
also important to recognize that some of the overall effects can come through the effect 
of income on savings. 
3.2  Savings mobilization and growth 
Some studies have also examined the relationship between domestic resource 
mobilization including private savings and economic growth. The Harrod Domar model 
predicts a strong positive relationship between economic savings and growth. Similarly, 
in the Solow-Swan model, a change in the savings rate changes the economy’s balanced 
growth path and hence per capita output in the steady state, but it does not affect the 
growth rate of output per worker on the balanced growth path. Only an exogenous 
technological change will result in a further increase in output per worker in the steady 
state. By contrast in the Romer growth model, technology is endogenized and therefore 
an increase in the savings rate not only raises the per capita output in steady state but 
also increases the growth rate of per capita output. 
Mavrotas and Santillana (1999) support the view that higher savings raise the growth of 
GDP by increasing capital accumulation. They note that the investment growth link has 
been challenged by a number of studies which argue that the co-movement of 9 
investment ratios and growth rates may be mainly the result of a third crucial factor, 
namely technological innovation, which drives both output expansion and capital 
accumulation. More precisely, they indicate that recent empirical studies cast serious 
doubts on the hypothesized positive impact of investment on growth. Mavrotas and 
Santillana provide robust empirical evidence according to which, even though a causal 
link seems to be apparent, the direction of causation runs from growth to investment and 
not vice versa, as pointed out by King and Levine (1994) and Benhabib and Jovanovic 
(1991) and much later by Blomstrom, Lipsey and Zejan (1996). However, the authors 
explain that the intrinsic endogeneity of the two makes the assessment of the direction 
of causation extremely difficult. 
Some authors have attempted to deal with the endogeneity problem of savings and 
growth through mechanisms such as the use of instrumental variables techniques and 
causality tests. Carroll and Weil (1993) use household level data to deal with this issue 
and conclude that there is evidence suggesting that growth indeed affects private 
savings positively. Cardenas and Escobar (1998) also examine the question of causation 
for Colombia by using a first-order vector autoregression of the growth rate and the 
savings rate for the 1925-94 period. They find that changes in national savings and 
changes in investment are perfectly correlated and that savings Granger-cause growth. 
Similarly, an earlier work by Edwards (1996) finds that the coefficient on the rate of 
growth in per capita GDP is significantly positive in a private savings regression, and 
seems to provide some support to the hypothesis that there is a vicious circle in 
operation. 
Mavrotas and Kelly (2001) use a methodology proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
to test for causality between growth and savings in order to avoid the problems and 
possible misleading inferences associated with the asymptotic nature of Granger 
causality testing in time-series studies. The relationship between gross domestic 
product, gross domestic savings and private savings is examined for India and 
Sri Lanka, and they find no causality between GDP growth and private savings in India, 
but there appears to be a bi-directional causality between private savings and growth in 
Sri Lanka. These authors conclude that the existing evidence on the subject should be 
treated with caution, given the inappropriateness of the econometric methodology 
adopted in most of the previous empirical studies using time-series data. 
In a related study, Kelly and Mavrotas (2003) use panel integration and cointegration 
tests for a dynamic heterogeneous panel of 17 African countries to examine the impact 
of financial sector development on private savings. They use three different measures of 
financial sector development to capture the variety of channels through which financial 
structure can affect the domestic economy. The empirical results obtained vary 
considerably among the countries in the panel, thus highlighting the importance of using 
different measures of financial sector development rather than a single indicator. The 
evidence is rather inconclusive, although in most of the countries in the sample a 
positive relationship between financial sector development and private savings seems to 
hold. Their empirical analysis also suggests that a change in government savings is 
offset by an opposite change in private savings in most of the countries in the panel, 
thus confirming the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. Liquidity constraints do not seem 
to play a vital role in most of the African countries in the group, since the relevant 
coefficient is negative and significant in only a small group of countries. 10 
Similarly, a study by Anoruo and Ahmad (2001) utilizes cointegration and the vector 
error-correction modelling technique (VECM) to explore the causal relationship 
between economic growth and growth rate of domestic savings for Congo, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia. Specifically, three analyses are 
undertaken; first, the time-series properties of economic growth and domestic savings 
were ascertained with the help of the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root procedure. 
Second, the long-run relationship between economic growth and growth rate of 
domestic savings was examined in the context of the Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
framework. Finally, a Granger-causality test was undertaken to determine the direction 
of causality between economic growth and growth rate of domestic savings. The results 
indicate one order of integration for each of the series. The results of the cointegration 
tests suggest that there is a long-run relationship between economic growth and the 
growth rate of savings. Also, contrary to conventional wisdom, economic growth prima 
facie causes growth rate of domestic savings for most of the countries in their sample. 
3.3  Financial sector development and economic growth 
Other studies have also examined the link between financial sector development, 
economic growth and poverty reduction in order to identify clearly the channels through 
which financial sector development can influence economic growth. Theorists can be 
subdivided into two broad schools of thought: (i) the structuralists, and (ii) the 
repressionists. The structuralists contend that the quantity and composition of financial 
variables induce economic growth by directly increasing savings in the form of financial 
assets, thus encouraging the capital formation that leads to economic growth and 
consequently poverty reduction. 
The financial repressionists, led by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973)—often referred 
to as the ‘McKinnon-Shaw’ hypothesis—contend that financial liberalization in the 
form of an appropriate rate of return on real cash balances is a vehicle for promoting 
economic growth. The essential tenet of this hypothesis is that a low or negative real 
interest rate will discourage savings. This will reduce the availability of loanable funds 
for investment which, in turn, will lower the rate of economic growth. Thus, the 
McKinnon-Shaw model posits that a more liberalized financial system will increase 
competition, increase interest rates and induce an increase in savings and investment 
and consequently promote economic growth. Empirical studies have also established the 
relationship between financial sector development and economic growth. Jung (1986) 
finds a bi-directional causality between financial and real variables in post-war data for 
56 countries, 19 of which are developed industrial economies. Demetriades and Hussein 
(1996) conduct causality tests and find little evidence that financial sector development 
causes economic growth. They note that causality patterns vary across countries. On the 
other hand, Wachtel and Rousseau (1995) find that financial sector development 
Granger-causes economic growth.  
3.4  Financial sector development and poverty reduction 
Few studies have attempted to establish the relationship between financial sector 
development and poverty reduction. The interaction between financial development and 
poverty can be examined by first considering the contribution that financial 
development makes to the growth performance of the economy. This, in turn, has 11 
implications for changes in the poverty level within the economy. Deininger and Squire 
(1996) and later Dollar and Kraay (2001) argue that growth has been beneficial for the 
poor. Using data on the income of the lowest quintiles, they show empirically that the 
poor have benefited from growth at least as much as the other quintiles. Dollar and 
Kraay’s empirical results suggest that ‘good’ macroeconomic policies, openness and 
globalization have a positive, direct impact on the income of the poor.  
Similarly, Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2001) examine the link between financial 
development and poverty reduction by using data for a sample of 26 countries, 
including 18 developing countries. They use bank deposit money assets, and net foreign 
assets as measures of financial development. Their results suggest that a 1 per cent 
change in financial development raises growth in the incomes of the poor in developing 
countries by almost 0.4 per cent.  
Financial development can also have an indirect impact on the living standards of the 
poor through its support of economic growth (World Bank 2001: 6). The relationship 
between growth and poverty has been the focus of considerable attention in recent years 
(Squire 1999; World Bank 2001; Ravallion 2001). A World Bank study (2001b: 52) 
explains that any given growth scenario can generate different poverty outcomes—for a 
given rate of growth, the extent of poverty reduction depends on how the distribution of 
income changes with changes in growth, and on initial inequalities in income, assets and 
access to opportunities to allow the poor to share in growth. Equi-proportional growth 
leaves income distribution intact, whereas by improving the position of some at the 
lower scale of distribution, it reduces poverty. Pro-poor growth, however, will by 
definition improve the status of the poor and affect income distribution.  
Studies have shown that financial sector development can lead to poverty reduction and 
can also affect inequality. For instance, Goudie and Ladd (1999) and McKay (2002) 
argue that although growth will benefit the non-poor in the society, at the same time it 
will improve income distribution. It is obvious, therefore, that aggregate growth may 
have different relationships to poverty. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2004) use 
data on 52 developing and developed countries over the period 1960-99 to assess 
whether there is a direct relationship between financial development (measured by 
credit to private sector ratio) and changes in income distribution. They find that the 
income of the poorest 20 per cent of the population grows faster than the average GDP 
per capita in countries with higher financial development, and that income inequality 
falls. They also find that financial development contributes to reductions in infant 
mortality. Similarly, Honohan (2004) finds that financial development (measured by 
private credit to GDP ratio) is negatively associated with headcount poverty, with a 
coefficient suggesting that a 10 percentage point increase in the ratio of private credit to 
GDP should (even at the same mean income level) reduce poverty ratios by 2.5 to 
3 percentage points. 
Some studies have examined the relationship between financial development and the 
distribution of income, about which there are competing theories. For example, 
Greenwood and Jovanovich (1990) argue that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between income inequality and financial development, that is, financial development 
leads to greater inequality to begin with, but which falls back again as financial 
development continues. This theory is based on the idea that financial intermediaries 
provide savers with higher returns and lower risks, but that poor individuals initially 
cannot afford to make use of these financial intermediaries, which results in growing 12 
inequality. It is assumed, however, that more and more poor people will be able to 
afford to use these intermediaries over time, offsetting the initial increase in inequality. 
Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993) argue that imperfections in 
financial markets create hurdles to borrowing funds for income-enhancing investments. 
It is only the rich who are able to overcome these hurdles and therefore they serve to 
perpetuate the initial distribution of wealth. Financial development overcomes these 
imperfections and therefore reduces income inequality (i.e., there is a negative 
relationship between the two). 
Clarke, Xu and Fou (2002) empirically investigate these alternative theories on the 
relationship between financial development and income inequality with data from 91 
countries between 1960 and 1995. As measures of financial development, they use 
credit to the private sector by financial intermediaries, and claims on the non-financial 
domestic sector by banks. Their findings support the theory that there is a negative 
relationship between financial development and income inequality rather than an 
inverted U-shaped relationship. They note that financial development reduces 
inequality, even when there are initially low levels of financial development. However, 
they also find that the beneficial impact of financial development on income inequality 
is smaller in countries with larger modern (non-agricultural) sectors. 
These same authors (Clarke, Xu and Fou 2002) also provide some support for the 
Kuznets based theory which suggests that financial development facilitates more 
migration from the low-income but more egalitarian agricultural sector to the higher-
income but unequal modern (industrial and services) sector. Thus, financial sector 
development increases inequality, although it still reduces income inequality as long as 
the modern sector accounts for less than 99.6 per cent of GDP (which was true of 
almost all countries in the sample). For the average country in the sample, they estimate 
that a 1 per cent increase in private credit reduces inequality by 0.3 per cent.  
Evidence on the relationship between financial development and inequality is mixed, 
that is, neither the theory nor the evidence is conclusive on the impact of financial 
development on inequality. In conclusion, there is strong evidence from the literature 
that financial sector development can lead to poverty reduction. The financial system in 
Ghana has witnessed considerable development, including interest rate liberation and 
the emergence of new products and institutions. However, there has been an empirical 
study using multivariate causality tests to establish and explain the relationship between 
financial sector development, savings mobilization and poverty reduction in Ghana. 
This raises the following issues: 
i)  Why has the financial sector development not stimulated domestic resource 
mobilization?  
ii)  Have financial intermediaries intermediated savings into the pro-poor sectors 
of the economy?  
iii)  Has the formal financial sector responded to interest rate cuts by the central 
bank to reduce the cost of credit to the pro-poor sector of the economy, 
particularly small and medium enterprises?  
These issues will be the principal focus of investigation by the proposed study. 13 
The study uses both descriptive and analytical statistical methods to examine the 
interrelationship between financial sector development, domestic resource mobilization 
and poverty reduction. It will specifically investigate the following issues: 
i)  Explore, with a series of causality tests, the direction of causality between 
(a)  financial sector development and domestic resource mobilization; 
(b)  financial sector development and poverty reduction; and (c) domestic 
resource mobilization and poverty reduction. These causal relationships will be 
examined; 
ii)  Investigate whether there is a long-run relationship between financial sector 
development and poverty reduction in Ghana; and 
iii)  Suggest ways in which the financial sector development in Ghana can 
accelerate poverty reduction. 
4 Methods  of  analysis 
The study adopts the descriptive statistical analysis approach using frequency 
distribution of indicators of financial sector development, domestic revenue 
mobilization and poverty. It exploits the causality between (i) financial sector 
development and domestic resource mobilization; (ii) financial sector development and 
poverty reduction, and (iii) domestic resource mobilization and poverty reduction. The 
causal relationships are examined with the help of a Granger-causality procedure. To 
determine whether there is a long-run relationship among financial sector development, 
domestic resource mobilization and poverty reduction, the Johansen cointegration 
procedure is used (Johansen and Juselius 1990; Johansen 1991). 
4.1   Definition of variables and data sources 
The detection of causal relationships within a set of variables is one of the objectives of 
empirical research. A degree of correlation between financial sector development, 
domestic resource mobilization and poverty reduction does not necessarily mean the 
existence of a causal relationship among them; it may simply be attributable to the 
common association of a third variable. Accordingly, Granger formulated a procedure 
for detecting a causal relationship among the variables applied in section 5. Having 
established the direction of causality, an empirical model of the determinants of 
financial sector development will be estimated. The model is specified as: 
Yi= β1 + βiXi + ei 
where Yi is financial sector development and Xs is a vector of explanatory variables 
including income measures of poverty. The variables used in the analysis are defined in 
Table 4. 
The study relies heavily on the data obtained from The Bank of Ghana Statistical 
Bulletins and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2003). Annual data 
from 1970 to 2002 are used. 14 
Table 4 
Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
GDSGDP  Gross domestic savings measured as a percentage of GDP 
DCRPGDP  Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP 
PCONS  Per capita consumption 
M2GDP  M2 as a percentage of GDP 
EX Exchange  rate 
POPG  Population growth rate 
TOT  Terms of trade 
5 Findings 
5.1  Unit root test 
We report the data properties by examining the unit root properties of the variables in 
Table 5. The equation estimated for the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is stated as 
follows: 
ΔΔ XXX tt t i t
i
n
t =+ + + −−
= ∑ φβ θ ε 01 1
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where  Δ is the first difference operator, t is the time trend, ε  is the stationary random 
error and n is the maximum lag length. The null hypothesis is that the series contains a 
unit root which implies that . 0 1 = β  The null hypothesis is rejected if  1 β is negative and 
statistically significant. 
Table 5 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test 
Variable t-adf  lag  1  Variable t-adf 
M2GDP -1.8518 3  ΔM2GDP -1.6206 
M2GDP -0.92123  2  ΔM2GDP -1.7201 
M2GDP -1.0185 1  ΔM2GDP -3.7202** 
M2GDP -1.0129 0  ΔM2GDP -4.9813** 
GDSGDP -2.7687  3  ΔGDSGDP -4.1902** 
GDSGDP -2.2767  2  ΔGDSGDP -2.6635 
GDSGDP -2.0322  1  ΔGDSGDP -3.7737** 
GDSGDP -3.7015*  0  ΔGDSGDP -9.8038** 
PCONS -3.5456*  3  ΔPCONS -2.9422 
PCONS -3.6002*  2  ΔPCONS -3.9141** 
PCONS -3.9469**  1  ΔPCONS -4.7750** 
PCONS -4.0135**  0  ΔPCONS -5.3824** 
DCRPGDP 0.70164  3  ΔDCRPGDP -0.93909 
DCRPGDP 0.88071  2  ΔDCRPGDP -1.5896 
DCRPGDP 0.96086  1  ΔDCRPGDP -2.3614 
DCRPGDP 1.9869  0  ΔDCRPGDP -3.0410* 
Notes:  * Lag length selected using T
1/. 
  Unit-root tests in levels 4 to 31; 
  Critical values: 5% = -2.971; 1% = -3.685; constant included; 
  Unit-root tests in 1st difference (Δ) 5 to 31;  
  Critical values: 5% = -2.975; 1% = -3.696; constant included. 15 
In all cases except for gross domestic savings measured as a percentage of GDP 
(GDSGDP), which is stationary in levels at zero lag length, the financial sector 
development indicators, M2/GDP and domestic credit to the private sector measured as 
a percentage of GDP (DCRPGDP) have unit roots. Per capita consumption (PCONS) 
also follows a random walk. All the variables that are stationary after first difference are 
integrated of first order I (1). These tests are complemented with graphical analysis 
(Appendix Figures 1 and 2) which shows that the variables become stationary after the 
first difference.  
5.2 Causality  test 
We undertake causality test to establish the link between financial development, 
domestic savings and per capita consumption (a measure of poverty) and these results 
are reported in Table 6. The null hypothesis of no causal relationships between gross 
domestic savings measured as a percentage of GDP (GDSGDP) and financial 
development measured as domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP 
(DCRPGDP) is accepted. In Ghana, the two variables do not predict each other. Credit 
to the private sector (DCRGDD) strongly predicts PCONS with a probability of 1 per 
cent. The key issue that emerges from Table 6 is that financial sector development 
induces poverty reduction. 
Table 6 
Granger causality test 
Sample: 1970 2001       
Lags: 3       
 Null hypothesis  Obs.  F-Statistics  Probability 
DDCRPGDP does not Granger-cause DGDSGDP  27   0.79617   0.51041 
DGDSGDP does not Granger-cause DDCRPGDP   0.76527   0.52683 
      
DM2GDP does not Granger-cause DGDSGDP  28   0.07838   0.97101 
DGDSGDP does not Granger-cause DM2GDP   0.31662   0.81320 
      
DPCONS does not Granger-cause DGDSGDP  28   0.06626   0.97719 
DGDSGDP does not Granger-cause DPCONS   1.54357   0.23270 
      
DM2GDP does not Granger-cause DDCRPGDP  27   0.07602   0.97221 
DDCRPGDP does not Granger-cause DM2GDP   0.47453   0.70350 
      
DPCONS does not Granger-cause DDCRPGDP  27   1.08022   0.38005 
DDCRPGDP does not Granger-cause DPCONS   6.65407   0.00269*** 
      
DPCONS does not Granger-cause DM2GDP  28   1.62635   0.21338 
DM2GDP does not Granger-cause DPCONS   1.54803   0.23162 
Notes:  *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
5.3  Financial sector development and poverty reduction 
Having established the causal relationship between financial sector development and 
poverty, we proceed with the Johansen (1982) procedure to test for the long-run 
relationship between financial sector development and poverty reduction in Ghana. The 
findings as presented in Table 7 reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1 per 
cent level of significance in favour of two cointegration vectors, at most. The long-run 16 
relationship between financial development, domestic savings and poverty in Ghana has 
thus been established. The fact that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship among 
the three series confirms the existence of causality at least in one direction. This goes to 
confirm the earlier estimates from the Granger causality test reported in Table 6. 
5.4  Johansen cointegration test 
Table 7 shows the eigenvalues, likelihood ratio is trace test statistics adjusted for 
degrees of freedom. The result shows that we have two significant vectors. It should be 
noted that in a system of N variables, we should expect to generate or identify N-1 
cointegrating vectors. The method used here helps us to get the most significant vectors. 
The cointegration test includes financial development indicators (DCRPGDP or 
M2GDP), domestic savings (GDSGDP) and per capita consumption (PCONS).  
The cointegrating vector is not identified unless we impose some arbitrary 
normalization. The normalized cointegrating relation assuming two cointegrating 
relation r = 2 is given in Table 8. The vectors are identified jointly and normalized with 
DCRPGDP and GDSGDP consistent with the objectives of the study. The first vector is 
normalized with DCRPGDP. We see that the coefficients of this vector for DCRPGDP 
are consistent with theory. 
Table 7 
Johansen cointegration test 
Hypothesized no. of CE(s) Eigenvalue  Trace statistic  5% Critical value  1% Critical value 
None **   0.723   50.107   29.68   35.65 
At most 1 *   0.434   15.443   15.41   20.04 
At most 2   0.001   0.029   3.76   6.65 
Note:  * (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level; 
  Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level. 
Table 8 
Normalized cointegration relationship 
DCRPGDP GDSGDP  PCONS  C 






Loglikelihood -198.6376     
Normalized cointegrating coefficients: 2 cointegrating equation(s) 
DCRPGDP GDSGDP  PCONS  C 
1.000000 0.000000  -0.098594 
(0.01754) 
24.57591 
0.000000 1.000000  -0.107728 
(0.01070) 
24.67147 
Loglikelihood -190.9306     
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5.5  Impulse response functions 
We analyse the impulse response function1 which traces the effect of a one standard 
deviation shock to one of the innovations on current and future values of the 
endogenous variables, namely DCRPGDP or M2GDP, GDSGDP and PCONS in this 
study. Figures 4 to 6 show the results of the impulse response analyses derived from the 
estimated VEC models. The number of lags used is 3 and based on the evidence 
provided by L = T
1/3 where L is number of lags and T is the number of data points used.  
Figure 4 shows the response of PCONS to DCRPGDP. A shock to domestic credit to 
the private sector (DCRPGDP) reduces per capita consumption (PCONS) slightly in the 
first two periods and increased thereafter. However, the response to the shock by gross 
domestic savings (GDSGDP) is positive throughout the period. 
Figure 5 also presents very straightforward results, as a DCRPGDP shock increases 
gross domestic savings throughout the entire period while a shock to per capita 
consumption increases slightly initially and dissipates thereafter. 
In Figure 6, while a one time shock to gross domestic savings increases domestic credit 
to the private sector significantly, consumption shock reduces domestic private sector 
credit over the period. This is consistent with theory.  
Figure 4 
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Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Source:  World Bank (2004). 
 
 
                                                 
1  The non-linear responses of each variable to one-time shocks in the others traced over time. It 
facilitates an evaluation of the economic importance of the estimated effects. 18 
Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
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Source:  World Bank (2004). 
5.6 Variance  decomposition 
We proceed by analysing the variance decomposition. The variance decomposition 
shows the relative importance of shocks in explaining the deviations in an endogenous 
variable at different time horizons. Variance decomposition of domestic credit to the 
private sector (Table 9) shows that 54 per cent is explained by own innovations, 45 per 19 
cent by shocks in gross domestic savings to the private sector and about 1 per cent by 
shocks in per capita consumption.  
For gross domestic savings to the private sector (Table 10), own innovations are 
dominant, as they explain 75 per cent, while domestic credit to the private sector and 
per capita consumption shocks account for 10 and 15 per cent, respectively.  
Table 9 
Variance decomposition of DCRPGDP  
Period S.  E. DCRPGDP  GDSGDP  PCONS 
  1  0.763334  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000 
  2  1.176674  96.95336  2.897771  0.148869 
  3  1.364637  95.20719  4.634740  0.158067 
  4  1.718788  86.41760  13.12995  0.452453 
  5  2.279829  69.95533  29.77262  0.272048 
  6  2.832831  61.09347  38.44323  0.463302 
  7  3.365944  55.77976  43.45032  0.769917 
  8  3.717240  53.40766  45.27839  1.313943 
  9  3.981644  53.59595  45.02523  1.378822 
10 4.214743  53.98803  44.71165  1.300310 
 
Table 10 
Variance decomposition of GDSGDP 
Period S.  E.  DCRPGDP  GDSGDP  PCONS 
  1   2.943256   5.619558   94.38044   0.000000 
  2   3.717786   3.525251   79.92048   16.55427 
  3   4.687001   10.20055   78.27052   11.52893 
  4   5.075143   8.883154   74.00783   17.10901 
  5   5.153183   10.23841   72.50481   17.25678 
  6   5.359838   9.967505   73.67782   16.35467 
  7   5.442229   9.745896   73.22124   17.03286 
  8   5.885659   10.98832   74.30563   14.70605 
  9   6.265994   9.820043   74.83177   15.34819 
10   6.593282   10.32316   74.74664   14.93020 
 
Table 11 
Variance decomposition of PCONS 
Period S.  E. DCRPGDP  GDSGDP  PCONS 
  1   12.23237   26.07145   4.784787   69.14376 
  2   16.64766   30.09125   20.52792   49.38083 
  3   19.32105   24.07165   31.48910   44.43925 
  4   24.55208   22.73100   48.12598   29.14302 
  5   31.66148   15.02865   62.28263   22.68873 
  6    36.38785   11.42264   64.42370   24.15366 
  7   41.02324   9.272141   68.04194   22.68592 
  8   44.17769   8.067642   68.73127   23.20108 
  9   46.98156   8.001191   69.71971   22.27910 
10   49.99163   7.290224   70.86455   21.84522 20 
Table 12 
Vector error correction model 
 Dependent  variables 
Explanatory variables   ∆ PCONSt  ∆DCRPGDPt  ∆GDSGDPt  ∆ M2GDPt 
              
ECM1  -0.419582 -0.042361  0.022988 -0.06185 
   (-1.44744)  (-2.65925) (-0.46655) (-1.86219) 
           
ECM2  1.507211 0.214065 0.645269 0.475427 
   (-0.62979)  (-1.62772) (-1.58626) (-1.73382) 
              
∆(PCONSt-1  0.011679 0.024976 0.101754 0.022262 
   (-0.04474)  (-1.74125) (-2.29343) (-0.74435) 
           
∆PCONSt-2  -0.032568 0.011399  -0.042114 0.043581 
    (-0.15704) -1.00025 (-1.19467) -1.83404 
           
∆ PCONSt-3  -0.392297 0.019591  -0.008713 0.036192 
    (-1.71090) -1.55484 (-0.22356) -1.37758 
           
∆ DCRPGDPt-1  -7.310698 -0.203241 -0.973211 -0.7003 
   (-1.32972)  (-0.67270) (-1.04140) (-1.11169) 
           
∆DCRPGDPt-2  2.945863 -0.551346  0.500612 -0.939682 
    -0.58469 (-1.99138) -0.58456 (-1.62779) 
∆DCRPGDPt-3  2.587089 -0.114388 -1.914735 -0.534344 
    -0.56637  (-0.45570) (-2.46609) (-1.02096) 
           
∆GDSGDPt-1  -3.636672 -0.35229  0.941766 -0.349282 
    (-1.46640)  (-2.58501) -2.23411 (-1.22921) 
           
∆GDSGDPt-2  -2.80842 -0.374603  1.057838  -0.258439 
    (-1.26492)  (-3.07033) -2.80306 (-1.01592) 
          
∆GDSGDPt-3  -2.491441 -0.205968  0.577137 -0.082809 
    (-1.41491)  (-2.12860) -1.92828 (-0.41045) 
           
∆M2GDPt-1  2.70431 -0.10246  0.63944 -0.291333 
   (-1.23725)  (-0.85304) (-1.72113) (-1.16330) 
           
∆M2GDPt-2  1.923338 -0.085619  0.064504 -0.041355 
   (-1.00205)  (-0.81174) (-0.19771) (-0.18805) 
           
∆M2GDPt-3  -2.002553 -0.057234 -0.003038  0.447299 
    (-1.06117) (-0.55191) (-0.00947) (-2.0687) 
           
C  -5.200789 0.240924 0.104107 0.10384 
   (-1.42676)  (-1.20275) (-0.16803) (-0.24863) 
R-squared 0.752236  0.668379 0.847315 0.607847 
Note:  T-statistics in parentheses. 
 
For per capita consumption (Table 11), gross domestic savings shocks are dominant in 
the system, accounting for 71 per cent of the innovations in per capita consumption. 
Own innovations contribute only 22 per cent, while domestic credit to the private sector 
explains 7 per cent. On the whole, per capita consumption is a variable that is weak in 
accounting for its own innovations and that of other variables. 
Finally, as can be seen from Table 12, an increase in credit to the private sector has a 
positive but insignificant effect on poverty in the country while a decrease in poverty 
levels has an insignificant effect on poverty. From column 3 it can be seen that a 21 
decrease in poverty levels leads to a significant improvement in gross domestic savings. 
Also, an increase in credit to the private sector reduces gross domestic savings. 
In trying to establish the relationship of the effect of financial development on poverty 
in Ghana, we modelled per capita consumption as our household welfare indicator 
(dependent variable). Table 12 presents the parameter estimates of four regressions. The 
fit is good in all the four regressions. The R
2 values show that a large proportion of the 
variations in per capita consumption is explained by the variations in the explanatory 
variables in the model. From Table 12 an increase in credit to the private sector has a 
positive but insignificant effect on poverty in Ghana. Also, from column 3, a decrease in 
poverty levels will lead to a significant improvement in gross domestic savings. 
Furthermore, an increase in credit to the private sector will reduce gross domestic 
savings.  
5.7  Financing the pro-poor sectors of the economy 
The empirical evidence above suggests that financial sector development Granger-
causes poverty reduction in Ghana. Furthermore, the impact of financial sector 
development on poverty is positive but insignificant, implying that financial sector 
development leads to poverty reduction if the financial intermediaries in Ghana allocate 
considerable proportions of their loan portfolio to those sectors of the economy that 
have strong links to poverty reduction. Increased credit to the private sector (an 
important indicator of financial sector development) can lead to poverty reduction, 
particularly when credit is intermediated to the pro-poor sectors of the economy, 
mainly, agriculture2 and industry. The Ghana Living Standards Survey indicates that the 
poor are mostly employed within the agricultural sector and are mostly foodcrop 
farmers. Furthermore, agriculture employs about 55 per cent of the population and 
contributes about 40 per cent to GDP in Ghana. Therefore, increased credit to the 
agricultural sector as well as manufacturing can significantly reduce poverty.  
In order to ascertain whether financial sector development in Ghana has actually 
affected the pro-poor sectors of the economy, we examine the proportion of domestic 
credit to the various sectors of the economy. From Table 13, it can be noted that total 
domestic credit increased from Cedis 1,416 billion in 1995 to Cedis 6,354 billion in 
1999 and then to Cedis 15,626 billion in 2003. Another notable finding is that there has 
been a decline in the share of domestic credit to the central government (decreasing 
from 59.0 per cent in 1995 to 45.6 per cent in 2002 to 32.5 per cent in 2003) while the 
shares of total domestic credit to public and private enterprises increased from 8.3 per 
cent to 14.2 per cent over the same period. Similarly, the share of domestic credit to the 
private sector increased from 46.1 per cent to 53.3 per cent over the same period; an 
increase of about 7.2 percentage points (Table 13). It can be argued that credit to private 
enterprises dominates the proportion of domestic credit to the three economic categories 
in 2003. This is a positive signal and more of similar policies should be pursued to 
stimulate private sector growth. Government over the years has crowded-out the private 
sector in terms of credit allocation and this has not encouraged the private investment 
needed to achieve sustained economic growth. 
                                                 
2  Agriculture accounts for about 40 per cent of GDP and employs 55 per cent of the labourforce 
according to GLSS 4. 22 
Viewed in terms of the allocation of credit to the various economic sectors of the 
country, the share of DMB credit to agriculture, one of the major drivers of growth and 
poverty reduction, declined consistently between 1999 and 2003. Similarly, the share of 
domestic credit to manufacturing declined between 2000-03. Likewise, the share of 
domestic credit to all the other sectors has declined over the past 4-5 years except for 
the category identified as ‘others’, comprising electricity, gas and water, import, export, 
and domestic trade, transport, storage and communications, services and cocoa 
marketing (Table 14).  
The decline in the share of DMB credit to manufacturing, mining and construction and 
also the zero change in the share of credit to agriculture raise certain issues for policy 
consideration. First, it questions the current effort of reducing poverty, given the 
marginal or zero change in credit to the agricultural sector, one of the key engines of 
growth. 
Table 13 
Distribution of domestic credit, 1995-2003 
  Central government    Public enterprises   Private  enterprises   Total 
Year  Cedis bn  %    Cedis bn  %    Cedis bn  %    Cedis bn 
1995 835.0  59.0    188.0  13.3   393.0 27.8    1,416.0 
1996 107.0  10.8    200.0  20.3   680.0 68.9    987.0 
1997 777.0  39.3    128.0  6.5   1,070.0  54.2    1,975.0 
1998 2,420.0  56.9    194.0  4.6   1,639.0 38.5    4,253.0 
1999 3,464.0  54.5    424.0  6.7   2,466.0 38.8    6,354.0 
2000 5,839.0  53.7    1,213.0 11.2    3,826.0 35.2    10,878.0 
2001 5,989.0  49.0    1,762.0 14.4    4,472.0 36.6    12,223.0 
2002 5,797.0  45.6    1,050.0 8.3   5,864.0 46.1    12,711.0 
2003 5,084.6  32.5    2,212.3 14.2    8,328.7 53.3    15,626.0 
2003, Q1  6,146.8  47.2   1,091.0  8.4   5,786.2 44.4    13,024.0 
2003, Q2  5,557.8  41.9   1,314.2  9.9   6,403.5 48.2    13,276.0 
2003, Q3  5,257.8  36.9    693.2  4.9   8,312.9 58.3   14,264.0 
2003, Q4  5,084.6  32.54   2,212.3  14.2   8,328.7 53.3    15,626.0 
Source:   Bank of Ghana (various years) 
Table 14 
Sectoral allocation of credit by DMBs, 1995-2003 
Year Agriculture  Manufacturing  Mining  Construction  Others  Total 
1995 9.7  29.8  1.5 11.7  47.3  100 
1996 10.8  31.0  4.0 9.8  44.4 100 
1997 12.0  22.8  5.1 10.1  50.0  100 
1998 12.2  24.6  5.0 11.2  47.0  100 
1999 11.8  24.9  5.8 8.9  48.6 100 
2000 9.6  28.1  5.5 6.8  60.3 100 
2001 9.6  19.3  4.0 6.8  60.3 100 
2002 9.4  21.1  3.7 7.8  58.0 100 
2003 9.4  20.7  2.9 5.0  62.0 100 
Source: ISSER  (2004). 23 
Second, the share of domestic credit to the industrial sector has been dwindling, 
implying that the concept of promoting industrialization and achieving a golden age of 
business in Ghana remains fuzzy. Ironically, the ‘others’ category took a significant 
proportion of DMB credit but this category is not the principal sector for poverty 
reduction. Thus to re-emphasize the point, credit to the pro-poor sector in Ghana has not 
increased to ensure poverty reduction. The reasons for this are varied, but one of the 
main factors has been the financing of government budget deficit through borrowing 
from the domestic banking system. 
Government borrowing has been handled through the sale of treasury bills at interest 
rates ranging between 26-40 per cent. Ghanaian financial institutions prefer to lend to 
the government than to the private sector, as treasury bills are considered very attractive 
and less risky. Borrowers, on the other hand, particularly those engaged in agricultural 
and manufacturing, find the cost of loans too expensive and cannot break even after 
their operating costs have been met. A related issue is the high default rate of loans, due 
partly to the lack of information on borrowers as well as the high interest rates. Another 
major factor explaining the low level of credit to the pro-poor sectors of the economy is 
the lack of ‘bankable’ projects or proper business plans. Furthermore, the absence of a 
well-developed insurance market means that banks require borrowers to provide 
collateral security as a guarantee against future default. Unfortunately, the lack of 
proper title to land in Ghana has disqualified many people engaged in agriculture from 
accessing loans. As can be noted from the foregoing, although financial sector 
development can cause poverty reduction, this has not been the case in Ghana.  
6  Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper sought to investigate the interrelationship between financial sector 
development, savings mobilization and poverty reduction in Ghana. The theoretical 
basis is that if financial sector development causes savings mobilization and savings 
causes poverty reduction, then by intuition, a developed financial market will promote 
poverty reduction.  In order to empirically investigate this relationship, the paper used 
annual data from 1970 to 2001 to ascertain the causal relationship between these 
variables and made very interesting findings. First, it found that although financial 
sector development does not Granger-cause savings mobilization in Ghana,   
financial sector development causes poverty reduction. Second, the effect of financial 
development on poverty in Ghana is positive but insignificant. This is because   
financial intermediaries in Ghana have not adequately channelled savings to the 
pro-poor sectors of the economy and the major reasons have been the government 
deficit financing, high default rate, lack of collateral and lack of proper business 
proposals. Another interesting finding is that there is a long-run cointegration 
relationship between financial sector development and poverty reduction.  
On the basis of the above findings, the paper suggests some key issues for policy 
consideration. First, the interest rate margin between lending and borrowing rates is too 
high to stimulate domestic savings in Ghana. Thus, the central bank in collaboration 
with the financial institutions should ensure that holders of savings accounts receive 
realistic interest rates. A related suggestion is that government borrowing through the 
sale of treasury bills should be minimized since it has not encouraged financial 
institutions to mobilize savings and on-lending to private investors. The study also notes 24 
that in Ghana financial sector development promotes poverty reduction. This implies 
that even though the country’s financial sector has not adequately mobilized domestic 
savings, they have affected poverty through investments in short- and long-term equity. 
Thus, the government could further stimulate the work of these intermediaries by 
offering tax concessions or reductions to the financial institutions who invest in the pro-
poor sectors of the economy, particularly in the agricultural sector. Finally, the high 
interest rate margin between lending and borrowing rates offered to the private sector 
has been attributed to the high level of loan defaults. The study believes that the default 
rate could be minimized by using the services of credit reference agencies and of 
insurance companies. In the case of the former, they could provide credit checks on 
potential borrowers to minimize the risk of lending to less creditworthy entrepreneurs. 
Insurance companies could also provide cover on loans made to private investors. These 
two channels have not been explored in Ghana and the paper suggests that the provision 
of such services be expedited.  
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